By Riëtte van Laack –

On August 24, 2011, another class action suit regarding “natural” food labeling claims was filed in the Southern District of California.  The defendants include Kashi Co. (“Kashi”) and its general manager, as well as Kashi’s parent Kellogg Co. and its President (the complaint also threatens to sweep in numerous other defendants, potentially including certain suppliers).  Plaintiffs, a national class of consumers who purchased Kashi products, claim defendants falsely and misleadingly labeled virtually all Kashi products as “all natural” or containing nothing artificial even though the products allegedly do not conform to applicable federal regulations and policies on “natural.”  The federal regulations and policies referenced in the complaint include the National Organic Program’s ("NOP’s") regulatory definition of “synthetic,” an inaccurate statement of FDA’s policy on “natural,” USDA’s policy on “natural,” and FDA’s regulatory definition of artificial flavor.  Plaintiffs further allege that the products in question do not conform to Kashi’s own definition of “natural,” which states:

Natural food is made without artificial ingredients like colors, flavors or preservatives and is minimally processed.

A natural ingredient is one that comes from or is made from a renewable resource found in nature.

Minimal processing involves only kitchen chemistry, processes that can be done in a family kitchen and does not negatively impact the purity of the natural ingredients.

Based on the referenced regulations and policies, as well as Kashi’s definition of “natural,” plaintiffs assert that a reasonable consumer understands the term “natural” to mean than none of the ingredients are synthetic or artificial, and none of the ingredients have undergone excessive processing.

In what appears to be a new twist, plaintiffs draw on manufacturing and other information from various sources to argue that Kashi’s products contain a number of “unnatural substances,” including but not limited to bromelain, plant sterols, potassium bicarbonate, xantham gum, yeast extract, inulin, cholecalciferol, ascorbic acid, calcium caseinate, lactic acid,  high oleic safflower oil, and a number of soy products.  The manufacturing information is drawn from NOP regulations (primarily 7 C.F.R. § 202.605(b)), a variety of food additive approval and GRAS listing regulations, the National Library of Medicine’s Hazardous Substances Data Bank, and the Environmental Protection Agency’s pesticide and hazardous substance regulations, among other sources.

Plaintiffs allege that they suffered not just economic injury, but also ingestion of “a substance that is generally harmful to their health, their children’s health, or their unborn fetus’s health,” and being “forced to unwittingly support an industry that contributes to environmental, ecological, or health damage.”  Plaintiffs allege numerous causes of action, including unfair business practices, false advertising, breach of express and implied warranty, negligent misrepresentation, and even assault and battery.  They request damages, statutory penalties, restitution, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and expenses, and costs, and an injunction.

By Kurt R. Karst –      

Last week, FDA issued its highly anticipated Proposed PDUFA V Reauthorization Performance Goals and Procedures for Fiscal Years 2013 through 2017, which were hammered out between FDA and industry after long negotiations.  The proposal includes several new provisions compared to the PDUFA IV Reauthorization Performance Goals.  We’ll focus on a couple of them here. 

Although many of the goals for priority and standard NDA and BLA review (including Class 1 and Class 2 resubmissions, efficacy supplements and manufacturing supplements) remain the same as under PDUFA IV, the proposed PDUFA V agreement establishes a new review model that will apply to all New Molecular Entity (“NME”) NDAs and original BLAs received from October 1, 2012, through September 30, 2017, including applications that are resubmitted following a refuse-to-file action.  The new review model, referred to as “the Program” in the PDUFA V proposal, is intended to “promote greater transparency and improve communication between the FDA review team and the applicant” and to “improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the first cycle review process and decrease the number of review cycles necessary for approval, ensuring that patients have timely access to safe, effective, and high quality new drugs and biologics.”

The parameters of the Program include, among other things, a pre-submission meeting (which the agreement says is “strongly encouraged”), a mid-cycle communication “to provide the applicant with an update on the status of the review of their application,” and a late-cycle meeting at which the FDA review team and the applicant will discuss the status of the review of the application.  At the pre-submission meeting, “FDA and the applicant will agree on the content of a complete application for the proposed indication(s), including preliminary discussions on the need for risk evaluation and mitigation strategies (REMS) or other risk management actions.”  In addition, “FDA and the applicant may also reach agreement on submission of a limited number of application components not later than 30 calendar days after the submission of the original application,” such as the submission of updated stability data.  The proposed agreement cautions that “[i]f the applicant does not have a pre-NDA/BLA meeting with FDA, and no agreement exists between FDA and the applicant on the contents of a complete application or delayed submission of certain components of the application, the applicant’s submission is expected to be complete at the time of original submission.”

As part of the Program, priority and standard NME NDAs and original BLA will be subject to different review goals as compared to other applications.  As shown in the table below, the proposed agreement says that FDA will review and act on 90% of standard NME NDA and original BLA submissions within 10 months of the 60 day filing date, and 90% of priority NME NDA and original BLA submissions within 6 months of the 60 day filing date.  Use of the filing date instead of the receipt date essentially means that the reviews are slated to take place within 12 months (priority) and 8 months (standard) from submission.

Another change of note is the treatment of “major amendments” to pending applications.  Under PDUFA IV (and FDA’s regulations at 21 C.F.R. § 314.60), “[a] major amendment to an original application, efficacy supplement, or resubmission of any of these applications, submitted within three months of a goal date, may extend the goal date by three months.  A major amendment to a manufacturing supplement submitted within two months of the goal date extends the goal date by two months” (emphasis added).  Under the proposed PDUFA V agreement, however, “[a] major amendment to an original application, efficacy supplement, or resubmission of any of these applications, submitted at any time during the review cycle, may extend the goal date by three months” (emphasis added), and “[a] major amendment to a manufacturing supplement submitted at any time during the review cycle may extend the goal date by two months” (emphasis added).  The proposed PDUFA V agreement says that a major amendment may include, among other things, “submission of a REMS with [elements to assure safe use (ETASU)] not included in the original application; or significant amendment to a previously submitted REMS with ETASU;” however, “changes to REMS that do not include ETASU and minor changes to REMS with ETASU will not be considered major amendments.”

The PDUFA V proposal includes several items intended to enhance regulatory science and expedite drug development, including: (1) initiatives to enhance FDA-sponsor communications (e.g., the agreement says that “FDA will develop a dedicated drug development communication and training staff within the Office of New Drugs in CDER and augment the manufacturers assistance staff in CBER”); (2) approaches and methods for the conduct of meta-analyses; (3) advancing the use of biomarkers and pharmacogenomics; and (4) advancing the development of patient-reported outcomes and other endpoint assessment tools. 

One initiative, styled as “Advancing Development of Drugs for Rare Diseases,” appears to show the growing importance of orphan drugs.  According to the proposal:

• By the end of FY 2013, FDA will complete a staffing and implementation plan for the CDER Rare Disease Program within the Office of New Drugs and a CBER Rare Disease liaison within the Office of Center Director.
• FDA will increase by five the staff of the CDER Rare Disease Program and establish and fill the CBER Rare Disease liaison position.
• On an ongoing basis, the staff in the Rare Disease Programs of the two Centers will develop and disseminate guidance and policy related to advancing and facilitating the development of drugs and biologics for rare diseases, including improving understanding among FDA reviewers of approaches to studying such drugs; considering non-traditional clinical development programs, study design, endpoints, and statistical analysis; recognizing particular challenges with post-market studies; and encouraging flexibility and scientific judgment, as appropriate, on the part of reviewers when evaluating investigational studies and marketing applications for drugs for rare diseases.
• By mid-FY 2014, FDA, through the Rare Disease Program, will conduct a public meeting to discuss complex issues in clinical trials for studying drugs for rare diseases, including such questions as endpoint selection, use of surrogate endpoints/Accelerated Approval, and clinical significance of primary endpoints; reasonable safety exposures; assessment of dose selection; and development of patient-reported outcome instruments.
• By the end of FY 2015, FDA will develop and implement staff training related to development, review, and approval of drugs for rare diseases. The training will be provided to all CDER and CBER review staff, and will be part of the reviewer training core curriculum.
• By the end of FY 2016, FDA, through the Rare Disease Program, will develop an evaluation tool to evaluate the success of the activities of the Rare Disease Program, including the reviewer training.

Peter L. Saltonstall, president and CEO of the National Organization for Rare Disorders, applauded the PDUFA V proposal, saying that “[t]he document reflects a clear recognition that drugs for rare diseases warrant special consideration and special staff training.”

Additional Reading:

• PhRMA Statement
• BIO Statement
• National Health Council Statement

By Kurt R. Karst –    

A recent Citizen Petition submitted on behalf of Abbott Laboratories (“Abbott”) calls into question FDA’s authority for granting Therapeutic Equivalence (“TE”) ratings (i.e., “A” ratings) for drug products approved pursuant to FDC Act § 505(b)(2).  Specifically, Abbott’s petition requests that FDA refrain from granting a TE rating to any 505(b)(2) application approved version of ANDROGEL (testosterone gel) until FDA has conducted a rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) “to modify the procedures that apply to such ratings.”  That rulemaking, says Abbott, “should establish procedures for (1) FDA’s assignment of TE ratings to drugs that are the subject of [505(b)(2) drugs] and (2) FDA’s public listing of such ratings in [the Orange Book].”  At a minimum, FDA’s new regulations should “characterize FDA’s assignment and listing of TE ratings for § 505(b)(2) drugs as either orders or substantive rules for purposes of the APA, describe what legal process is available to interested parties for commenting on or challenging a proposed listing, and establish a coherent set of standards governing such a listing.” 

The submission of 505(b)(2) applications for certain versions of transdermal testosterone gel drug products – specifically ANDROGEL and TESTIM – was the subject of two FDA Citizen Petition responses (here and here).  In each case, FDA determined that proposed generic transdermal testosterone gel drug products containing new or different inactive ingredients must conduct skin transfer, hand-washing, and possibly showering studies, and that such studies are outside the scope of an ANDA submission. 

Although “A” TE codes are typically associated with generic versions of a brand-name drug approved under an ANDA, a drug product approved under a 505(b)(2) application may also be assigned an “A” rating to a listed drug (which was  approved either under a “full” 505(b)(1) NDA or a 505(b)(2) application).   Some examples of A-rated 505(b)(2) drug products from the current edition of the Orange Book include Pamidronate Disodium (NDA No. 021113), Fluorescein Sodium (NDA No. 022186), Nicardipine HCl (NDA No. 022276), and Azithromycin (NDA No. 050809).

Much has changed in the world since FDA’s 1980 final rule (45 Fed. Reg. 72,582 (Oct. 31, 1980) amending 21 C.F.R. § 20.117(a)(3) to make available “a list of FDA-approved prescription drug products, together with therapeutic equivalence evaluations of products in the List that are available from more than one source” (i.e., the Orange Book).  Too much, in fact, according to Abbott. 

Back in 1979 when FDA proposed the Orange Book (44 Fed. Reg. 2932 (Jan. 12, 1979)), which was preceded by a December 1978 lawsuit challenging FDA’s authority to issue the Orange Book (Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Kennedy, 471 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Md. 1979)), and again in the 1980 final rule establishing the Orange Book, FDA took the position that TE ratings are “nonregulatory” (and therefore not rules or orders subject to APA rulemaking) because they are solely advisory and that they entail only the application of FDA’s TE criteria (i.e., pharmaceutical equivalence, bioequivalence, adequate labeling, and cGMP compliance) to information that is already in FDA’s files that the Agency gathers as part of the approval process.  For example, FDA, in rejecting the proposition that the Orange Book “constitute[s] an order or a rule as defined in the [APA],” commented in the preamble to the 1980 final rule that:

the List neither determines nor adjudicates the legal rights of any drug manufacturer or distributor; it does not impose any requirement or restriction upon any person; it does not interpret or apply the act in a manner that creates any obligation on any person; it makes no recommendation as to which products persons should purchase, prescribe, or dispense, or conversely, which products should be avoided.

Moreover, FDA says in the preamble to the final rule that:

To the extent that the List sets forth FDA's evaluations of the therapeutic equivalence of drug products that have been approved, it contains FDA’s advice to the public and to the States regarding an important public health matter. These evaluations do not constitute determinations that any products are in violation of the act or that any products are preferable to others. These are nonregulatory evaluations that are based on the application of certain criteria to information contained in FDA files. Most of the reasons cited by the comments for demanding an evidentiary hearing (for example, determinations of effectiveness and bioequivalence) concern determinations that were made by FDA in clearly defined proceedings when there existed the right to an evidentiary hearing. Thus, the notice and comment procedure used in adopting this List is sufficient.

According to Abbott, “[e]ven if this reasoning was correct” a few decades ago, it is no longer correct today, “at least as applied to § 505(b)(2) drugs,” for two primary reasons:

First, TE listings are now far more than advisory.  They have been expressly incorporated into state pharmacy practice statutes that control which drug products pharmacists may dispense and, therefore, which drug products patients receive when filling prescriptions at the pharmacy.  TE listings also directly affect federal, state, and private insurance reimbursement schemes, and are expressly relied upon in Medicare Part B, among other federal laws.  These listings materially impact the economic rights of competing drug sponsors.  Thus, TE listings have automatic and significant binding legal consequences under state and federal law.

Second, TE listings for § 505(b)(2) drugs can in no way be characterized as merely the product of information already “contained in FDA files” that is based upon findings made in the course of the § 505(b)(2) approval process.  The Agency can perhaps make a plausible case for characterizing TE listings for duplicate drugs approved under abbreviated new drug applications, or “ANDAs,” as merely a summary of the statutory findings that FDA makes in approving such drugs under § 505(j)(1) of the FDCA.  But even if so, FDA cannot make the same case for § 505(b)(2) drugs because the elements of a TE evaluation cannot be found in § 505(b)(2) (or any other statutory provision applicable to § 505(b)(2) drugs).

Among other things, Abbott relies on the 2001 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Tozzi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 271 F.3d 301 (D.C. Cir. 2001) for the proposition that there is precedent establishing that TE listings have a binding legal effect.  In that case, concerning HHS’s decision to change the carcinogenic status of dioxin in a report, the Court explained that “[r]eviewability under the APA hinges upon whether the listing has ‘legal effect, which in turn is a function of the agency’s intention to bind either itself or regulated parties.’”  Similarly, says Abbott, “FDA’s listing of TE ratings for particular drugs, like the Secretary of HHS’s decision to classify substances as known or suspected carcinogens in the Report, ‘triggers obligations’ under federal and state law.  Under the reasoning of Tozzi, therefore, that listing has ‘binding [legal] effect’ for APA purposes.”  Moreover, according to Abbott, “Tozzi demonstrates that it is no longer the case, if it ever was, that FDA’s listing of TE ratings can be characterized as purely informational and advisory – and thus without regulatory effect.”

Abbott’s Citizen Petition is not the first time TE ratings with respect to 505(b)(2)-approved drug products have caused controversy.  In May 2009, FDA, in responding to a Citizen Petition, affirmed its decision to grant an AP rating for Nicardipine HCl (NDA No. 022276).  Several years ago, FDA also had to address TE ratings with respect to Levothyroxine Sodium drug products approved under FDC Act § 505(b)(2).

By Kurt R. Karst –      

In what appears to be the first instance in which a court has considered the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing in the context of a preemption defense in a state tort-law failure-to-warn case, Nevada State Court Judge Jerry Wiese II recently granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Preemption Defense for Dear Doctor Liability in three propofol hepatitis infection cases – Carol Keck v. Endoscopy Center of Southern Nevada, L.L.C., et al., No. 08A575837, Megan T. Gasper, et al. v. Endoscopy Center of Southern Nevada, L.L.C., et al., No. 08A579660, Betty Hymas v. Endoscopy Center of Southern Nevada, L.L.C., et al., No. 08A582492, Nev. Dist., Clark Co.  In doing so, the court concluded that Mensing does not preempt the Plaintiffs’ claims that certain generic drug manufacturers could have sent a “Dear Doctor” or “Dear Healthcare Provider” letter warning against reuse of vials containing propofol (and that allegedly cause hepatitis infection).

In Mensing, the Court invoked the doctrine of impossibility preemption to hold that federal drug regulations applicable to generic drug manufacturers directly conflict with, and thus preempt, state tort-law claims based on drug manufacturers’ alleged failure to provide adequate warning labels for their products.  As part of its decision, the Court deferred to FDA’s position, articulated the Agency’s brief to the Court, that the Changes Being Effected (“CBE”) procedures are not available to generic drug sponsors to add or strengthen label warnings.  (As we recently reported, Public Citizen has submitted a citizen petition to FDA requesting that the Agency amend its regulations to permit ANDA sponsors to revise their labeling through the CBE and Prior Approval Supplement procedures.) 

With respect to “Dear Doctor” letters, FDA said in its brief to the U.S. Supreme Court that they qualify as labeling and, therefore, must be “consistent with and not contrary to [the drug’s] approved . . . labeling.”  Thus, the Supreme Court, again deferring to FDA, said that a “[a] Dear Doctor letter that contained substantial new warning information would not be consistent with the drug’s approved labeling,” and concluded that “federal law did not permit the Manufacturers to issue additional warnings through Dear Doctor letters.” 

In his decision, Judge Wiese writes that although “[t]his Court does not agree with the reasoning or the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Mensing . . . . it is obligated to follow its decision.”  However, the Supreme Court did not, writes Judge Wiese,

indicate that “Dear Doctor” letters that were “consistent and not contrary” to the labeling, were preempted. . . .  While the FDA apparently believed that no liability may lie for failure to send such a letter unilaterally, the U.S. Supreme Court did not adopt this language, or set forth this holding as their own.  Consequently, it is not part of the Mensing ruling, and is not binding upon this Court. 

Continuing, Judge Wiese states that “[w]hile the U.S. Supreme Court may not have intended to leave this small argument available, the Court’s decision seems to indicate that a ‘Dear Doctor’ letter that is ‘consistent with and not contrary to the drug’s approved label,’ and which does not provide ‘substantially new’ or ‘additional’ warnings, would not be preempted under [Mensing].”  Judge Wiese is quick to note, however, that “[e]ven if the ability to send a ‘Dear Doctor’ letter is not precluded or preempted under Mensing, this Court is unclear with regard to the legal theory under which the Plaintiffs anticipate asserting a ‘duty’ to send a ‘Dear Doctor’ letter, since [Mensing] seems to hold that the state law failure to warn claim is preempted.”

It will be interesting to see whether this and other, let’s just call them “interesting,” arguments floating around out there will gain any traction in courts.

By Ricardo Carvajal –

FDA published a Federal Register notice asking for nominations of individuals to serve as voting members on the Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee ("TPSAC").  The TPSAC has been ensnared in controversy due to allegations of bias and conflicts of interest among current and previous members.  As we noted in a prior blog posting, FDA's constitution of, and reliance on, the TPSAC is the subject of a lawsuit filed by Lorillard.  Doubtless FDA's selection of new voting members will be closely scrutinized.  Nominations are due by November 2.

By Kurt R. Karst –      

In a Report to Congress issued earlier this year and recently made public, FDA’s Rare Disease Group (“RDG”) and Neglected Tropical Disease Group (“NTDG”) report on their findings and recommendations to improve the current regulatory/scientific  armamentarium to facilitate the development of products for rare and neglected diseases.  As we previously reported, the report was required by Section 740 of the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2010 (Public Law No. 111-80), which also required FDA to establish the RDG and NTDG.  An attempt to build on Section 740 in appropriations legislation for Fiscal Year 2011 – see our previous posts here and here – was unsuccessful given all of the wrangling over the budget.  The findings and recommendations for both the RDG and NTDG are reported below.

RDG Report

Based on its review of FDA practices for regulating products for rare diseases, and comments and recommendations from a June 2010 public hearing (Docket No. FDA–2010–N–0218) (see our previous post here) and an October 2010 report from the Institute of Medicine, titled “Rare Diseases and Orphan Products: Accelerating Research and Development,” the RDG “identified both strengths and constraints in the current paradigm for drug and device regulation.”  According to FDA,

An evaluation of current agency practices revealed that extant regulations provide the flexibility needed for the review of medical products for the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of rare diseases.  FDA recognizes that, for all serious and life-threatening diseases, greater drug safety risks may be justified when the potential benefits of the drug are seen in the essential aspects of the disease and outweigh these risks.  The approval standard for drugs and biologic medical products of “substantial evidence of effectiveness” and safety remains an appropriate one for rare diseases.  In devices, the approval standard for a humanitarian device exemption (HDE) of reasonable assurance of safety and probable benefit is also appropriate.  Current regulations allow for flexibility and scientific judgment9 when applying the standard in assessing the totality of the evidence. FDA has successfully applied this flexibility to approve therapeutics for rare genetic diseases (e.g., Huntington’s disease) and rare cancers, among others. . . .

In addition, FDA says that the Agency “makes best use of existing regulatory provisions to facilitate efficient drug development and availability of drugs to patients during the investigational period,” including use of the Fast Track and Accelerated Approval processes, Priority Review, and Expanded Access of patients to investigational products. 

Notwithstanding the various FDA strengths identified in the report, FDA says that there are “clear areas for potential improvement,” which the Agency is trying to address through various ongoing activities, including “[e]xamining and evaluating policy and procedures for the regulation of medical products for rare diseases,” “[d]eveloping education and training programs for FDA rare disease reviewers and external stakeholders,” and “[i]ncreasing communication efforts involving rare diseases to stakeholders within the Federal government and outside FDA, as well as academia and the research community, industry, professional associations, and advocacy organizations.”  Given the significant increase in recent years to develop products for rare diseases (which is expected to continue for years to come), it is important that certain “impediments to progress” be addressed, including, according to FDA, “the often inadequate scientific foundation and core knowledge vital to support medical product development for rare diseases, limited regulatory precedents for most of the individual diseases and some of the most technologically innovative products in development, and suboptimal collaboration among relevant stakeholders.”  Some of the items listed under "Advancing Development of Drugs for Rare Diseases" in the proposed PDUFA V Reauthorization Performance Goals and Procedures (Fiscal Years 2013 through 2017) issued on August 31, 2011 appear to be directed to addressing some of these issues.

The RDG’s recommendations identify three key areas in need of additional efforts: (1) “increase the foundation of biomedical and regulatory science required to support development and regulatory assessment of medical products for rare diseases,” including conducting disease-specific natural history studies, identifying, developing, and qualifying novel biomarkers, and exploring the use of novel clinical trial designs and statistical methods; (2) “[i]ncrease collaboration among rare disease stakeholders both within and outside FDA;” and (3) “[g]ain a thorough understanding of the regulatory history of orphan drug products to help identify effective development approaches, particularly for addressing the uncertainties of biomedical knowledge along the product development pathway, so that patterns can be adapted to future development programs.”  This last key area includes performing “a detailed analysis of FDA’s 27-year history of Orphan drug approvals to identify factors and methods that have led to successful drug development and approval or have impeded development and identify areas for improvement,” and, in the case of medical devices, analyzing “the reasoning presented in device applications for requesting a [HDE] as well as why an application was successful or not with the goal of identifying areas for improvement” and undertaking an assessment of the barriers to and incentives for the development of medical devices for rare diseases.

NTDG Report

The NTDG report is less detailed than the RDG report, presumably given the more recent focus on tropical diseases product development, which the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development has tracked (see our previous report here).  (According to a World Health Organization report, neglected tropical diseases blight the lives of 1 billion people worldwide!)  The NTDG report is based on the group’s assessment of ongoing and planned activities and input and recommendations FDA received from a September 2010 public hearing (Docket No. FDA-2010-N-0364) on issues and concerns related to the development of neglected tropical disease products.  According to the NTDG,

appropriate regulatory paradigms are in place through FDA’s existing programs and activities related to FDA review of marketing applications for products for NTDs.  FDA has approved, licensed, or cleared a number of products for NTDs. . . .  FDA’s Office of International Programs has existing outreach activities related to NTD product development.  Nevertheless, the NTD group found that enhancing efforts, including those in Federal, academic, and other collaborative programs, could help strengthen certain basic and applied research areas (e.g., regulatory science), that form the foundation for medical product development and the basis of regulatory review and assessment.  The NTD group also found that enhancing the clinical trials infrastructure, through clinical trials consortia or other organizations, could facilitate the conduct of trials in countries of the developing world where NTDs mostly occur.

The NTDG makes four recommendations for improving the development of neglected  tropical disease products, including issuing guidance documents on neglected tropical disease drug product development (like the draft guidance FDA issued last week, titled “Neglected Tropical Diseases of the Developing World: Developing Drugs for Treatment or Prevention"), revising CBER’s “General Principles for the Development of Vaccines to Protect Against Global Infectious Diseases,” holding a CDRH Expert Panel meeting to discuss FDA’s regulation of diagnostic tests for pulmonary tuberculosis, and issuing guidance on the regulation of diagnostic tests for pulmonary tuberculosis.  The NTDG also notes that “[o]ne other consideration is to explore extending FDA’s Orphan Drug Grants Program to include grants for studies of diagnostic tests or other devices for NTDs.”

The NTDG report also says that “strengthening the scientific foundation that forms the basis of drug development and FDA’s regulatory process would greatly improve overall development process for NTD products.”  This includes basic and applied neglected tropical disease research by other Federal agencies (e.g., the National Institutes of Health), academia, or other consortia. 

We also note that FDC Act § 524, added to the statute by the 2007 FDA Amendments Act, created a new Priority review Voucher (“PRV”) program.  Under the PRV program, sponsors of certain new drugs and biologics for “tropical diseases” that have received priority review may receive a PRV entitling the holder to a 6-month priority FDA review of another application that would otherwise be reviewed under FDA’s standard 10-month review clock.  That program, as we recently reported, has not yet panned out, perhaps due, in part, to the high PRV redemption user fee FDA has set.  In Fiscal Year 2011 the PRV redemption fee was set at $4,582,000.  The Fiscal Year 2012 PRV redemption fee was just set by FDA at $5,280,000 – and that figure is in addition to the Fiscal Year 2012 full application fee of $1,841,500.  As we previously reported, legislation has been introduced to amend FDC Act § 524.

By Kurt R. Karst –      

On August 31, 2011, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) announced the issuance of its final report, titled “Authorized Generic Drugs – Short-Term Effects and Long-Term Impact,” which has been in the works for years since it was requested in 2005 by several members of Congress.  The massive (270 pages in all) final report follows up on the FTC’s June 2009 interim report (“Authorized Generics: An Interim Report”). 

As we previously reported, the interim report presented the first set of results from the FTC’s study of authorized generics and focused on the effects of authorized generic introduction during the first, 180-day period of competition by a generic drug.  Not surprisingly, the FTC found in 2009 that drug retail and wholesale prices dropped, as well as an ANDA sponsor’s revenues (which sponsor was granted 180-day exclusivity) with the introduction of an authorized generic.  Those results were carried through to and modified in the FTC’s final report. 

The interim report also raised the FTC’s concern about the use of authorized generics in the context of patent settlement agreements and commented on how, according to the FTC, such agreements can harm consumers.  The final report includes additional data that the FTC says confirms its interim findings. 

The “authorized generic controversy,” as the FTC frames it, is as follows:

Brand-name companies that offer AGs contend that they are procompetitive – that they make valuable products available to consumers at lower prices than those of brand-name products and provide competition that leads to lower generic prices overall.  Some in the generic drug industry, in contrast, contend that AGs harm competition by drawing revenues away from generic firms during the 180-day exclusivity period provided for first-filers that challenge a brand-name company’s patents.  They caution that this reduces the potential reward available to generics that challenge patents, thereby discouraging patent challenges that facilitate earlier generic competition and reduce prices for consumers.  This, the AG critics argue, undermines long-run competition and the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.

The FTC’s final report, which includes a lot of nifty data, analysis, and commentary, to keep folks busy reading and thinking through the long Labor Day weekend (e.g., data on Paragraph IV certification filings and 180-day exclusivity), says that the bottom line is that although “authorized generics have a substantial effect on the revenues of competing, generic firms during the 180-day exclusivity period . . . the reduced revenue stemming from authorized generic competition during 180-day exclusivity has not affected the generic’s incentives in a way that has measurably reduced the number of patent challenges by generic firms;” however, “there is strong evidence that agreements not to compete with an authorized generic have become a way for brand-name companies to compensate generic competitors for delaying entry.”

The final report contains four main findings:

• Competition from authorized generics during the 180-day marketing exclusivity period has led to lower retail and wholesale drug prices.  During this time, competition by an authorized generic is associated with retail prices that are four-to-eight percent lower, and wholesale prices that are 7 to 14 percent lower, than those without an authorized generic.

• Authorized generics have a substantial effect on the revenues of competing generic firms.  During the 180-day exclusivity period, the presence of an authorized generic competitor on average reduces the first-filing generic’s revenues by 40 to 52 percent. In addition, revenues of the first-filing generic are between 53 and 62 percent lower during the first 30 months after the exclusivity period ends, if it is facing authorized generic competition. Introduction of an authorized generic can mean hundred of millions of dollars in lost revenue for the first generic competitor to enter the market.

• Lower expected profits could affect a generic company’s decision to challenge patents on products with low sales.  However, the reduced revenues resulting from authorized generic competition during the 180-day exclusivity period have not substantially reduced the number of challenges to branded drug patents by generic firms. Despite the presence of authorized generic competition, generic companies have continued to challenge patents, even on brand-name drugs in small markets.

• There is strong evidence that agreements not to compete using authorized generics have become a way that some branded firms compensate generic firms for delaying entry to the market.

It is the last finding that the FTC will almost certainly use to further its agenda (read crusade) both on Capitol Hill and elsewhere to put an end to patent settlement agreements, or what opponents call “pay-for-delay” or “reverse payment” agreements.  Retiring Senator Herb Kohl’s (D-WI) bill to restrict such agreements, the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act (S. 27), was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee in July.  The FTC’s final report could add some steam to the bill.  (For an interesting twist on how the FTC handled a recent case, see WLF’s The Legal Pulse recent post “FTC Injects Its Crusade Against “Reverse Payment” Drug Patent Suit Settlements into Merger Consent Order.”)

What is less clear is how the FTC’s final report might pan out for Sen. John Rockefeller’s (D-WV) pending bill, the Fair Prescription Drug Competition Act (S. 373), and the related bill introduced in the House of Representatives by Rep. Jo Ann Emerson (R-MO), H.R. 741.  (See our previous post here.)  Both bills would amend the FDC Act to prohibit the manufacture, marketing, sale, or distribution of an authorized generic version of an NDA-approved drug until any period of 180-day exclusivity associated with an ANDA for a generic version of that NDA-approved drug has expired or has been forfeited.  The FTC’s final report could take any wind out of the sails of those bills.

ADDITIONAL READING:

• Waxman/Rockefeller Statements

• GPhA Statement

By Anne Marie Murphy –

This week FDA announced the publication of a draft guidance titled, “Oversight of Clinical Investigations: A Risk Based Approach to Monitoring.”  This is the first time since 1988 that the agency issued a specific guidance document on how a study sponsor may meet its obligation to monitor or oversee the conduct of a clinical study. 

For purposes of the guidance, “monitoring” refers to the methods that sponsors and contract research organizations (“CROs”) use to oversee the conduct of and reporting of data from clinical studies.  FDA indicates that the primary focus of study monitoring should be protecting study subjects, ensuring the integrity of study data, and ensuring that clinical investigators comply with applicable regulations. 

Sponsors have always been free to adopt monitoring practices and procedures as they saw fit.  Historically, however, FDA notes that industry sponsors have relied heavily on frequent on-site visits to clinical sites to verify data and ensure compliance.  FDA also notes a misconception on the part of industry that FDA expects 100% verification of study data.  

In addition to on-site monitoring, the draft guidance encourages the use of centralized monitoring, i.e., remote evaluation of study data at a location other than the site where the study is being conducted.  The extent to which remote or centralized monitoring is used should depend on the complexity of the study and the electronic accessibility of study data.  According to the guidance, centralized monitoring should:

• include activities that can be done as well or better remotely (e.g., standard checks for consistency and completeness of data);
• target on-site monitoring by identifying higher risk clinical sites;
• perform monitoring activities that can only be done in a centralized manner (e.g., statistical analyses to identify data trends);
• identify missing or inconsistent data and potential protocol violations;
• verify source data remotely, where both source data and CRFs can be accessed remotely;
• analyze site characteristics (e.g., high screen failure or protocol violation rates and delays in reporting data);
• complete administrative tasks such as collecting regulatory documents.

For each clinical trial, FDA recommends that the sponsor develop a monitoring plan that describes:

• the monitoring approaches and procedures to be used;
• communicating monitoring results;
• managing noncompliance, including developing specific processes for investigating suspected data falsification;
• training and study-specific information, including training monitors and study site staff.

FDA intends to evaluate processes through which sponsors may voluntarily submit monitoring plans to the appropriate FDA review division and request feedback. 

The guidance also addresses a sponsor’s ability to transfer of monitoring obligations to a CRO.  It notes that any such transfer must be in writing, and that the sponsor retains responsibility to oversee the CRO’s activities. 

Comments on the draft guidance should be submitted by November 28, 2011.

By Ricardo Carvajal –

In June, we reported that the DC Circuit Court of Appeals decided it lacked exclusive jurisdiction over a Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) citizen petition seeking FDA action against BPA.  Undeterred, NRDC has now filed its complaint in district court.  The complaint catalogues numerous risks allegedly posed by BPA, contends that food is the principal rout of exposure for most people, and contends that FDA underestimates BPA exposure resulting from consumption of canned food.  The complaint further alleges that "consumers trying to protect themselves and their families from BPA exposure are unable to do so because food packaging and containers made with the chemical are rarely so labeled" – an allegation that appears to take no notice of the healthy market for products bearing "BPA-free" claims.  The complaint asks the court to compel FDA to issue a substantive respond to NRDC's petition by a fixed date.

By Kurt R. Karst –      

On August 29, 2011, Public Citizen announced that it submitted a citizen petition to FDA requesting that the Agency amend its regulations to permit ANDA sponsors to revise their labeling through the Changes Being Effected (“CBE”) and Prior Approval Supplement (“PAS”) procedures.  The petition is in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 23, 2011, 5-4 landmark consolidated decision in PLIVA Inc. v. Mensing (Docket No. 09-993), Actavis Elizabeth, L.L.C. v. Mensing (Docket No.  09-1039), and Actavis, Inc. v. Demahy (Docket No. 09-1501) (and for which rehearing was requested and recently denied), in which the Court invoked the doctrine of impossibility preemption to hold that federal drug regulations applicable to generic drug manufacturers directly conflict with, and thus preempt, state tort-law claims based on drug manufacturers’ alleged failure to provide adequate warning labels for their products (see our previous post here), and in response to FDA’s position (pages 16-17) that the CBE and PAS procedures are not available to ANDA sponsors to add or strengthen label warnings.  (Public Citizen submitted an amicus brief in the Mensing case in support of Respondents.)

The Public Citizen petition makes three requests:

(1)  That FDA amend, through notice and comment rulemaking, its PAS and CBE regulations at 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(a) to specify that subsections (b) and (c) apply to ANDA sponsors.  Such an amendment, says Public Citizen “might also make exceptions to reflect situations in which the agency believes that particular ANDA holders lack an adequate basis to make labeling changes, such as, perhaps, during the first few months after the first ANDA holder enters the market or for an ANDA holder that sells very few prescriptions of a drug (for example, under 1,000 prescriptions per year);”

(2) That FDA amend its regulation at 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10) (permtting ANDA approval to be withdrawn if a generic drug’s approved labeling differs from that of the RLD) “to specify that this regulation does not apply to ANDA holders permitted to supplement labeling through CBE or PAS procedures;” and

(3) That FDA clarify in its regulations (and specifically 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i)(A)) “that all ANDA holders are required to report safety concerns to the FDA as soon as they become aware of a clinically significant hazard.”  

Public Citizen’s petition is premised on the contention that despite significant changes in the generic drug market since the 1984 enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, “FDA regulation of generic labeling has remained substantially unchanged.”  “The regulatory revisions requested here would bring postmarket regulation in line with the realities of the pharmaceutical market and help to ensure that drug labeling provides adequate warnings to patients based on information that comes to light after the drug is approved for marketing,” says the petition.  Moreover, according to Public Citizen, “FDA’s position on the inapplicability of 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 to ANDA holders, and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in PLIVA, which turns on the limitations of the regulatory scheme, threaten the safety of prescription drugs, and accordingly, pose unnecessary risks to patients.”  Amending FDA’s regulations to make the PAS and CBE procedures applicable to ANDA sponsors in response to new risk information would undo the impossibility that the Supreme Court found in Mensing, says Public Citizen.  “In that event, common law could once again complement the FDA’s mandate to monitor drug safety across the full range of drugs, rather than just the decreasing portion occupied by brand-name drugs.” 

Interestingly, Public Citizen contends that its proposed regulatory changes “would not impose an obligation beyond the capacity of generic manufacturers.”  “It is our understanding,” says Public Citizen, “that under current regulations, a generic manufacturer is designated by the FDA to maintain the label of a drug when the name-brand manufacturer of that drug withdraws from the market.  This procedure manifests the FDA’s confidence in the ability of generic manufacturers to perform ongoing pharmacovigilance duties – which makes sense, given their substantial scientific and financial resources, as well as the effort they must already invest to comply with post-approval safety regulations.”  This is presumably a reference to FDA’s practice of unilaterally designating an ANDA as the sole RLD for a multi-source generic drug product where the brand-name drug has been discontinued and is listed in the Discontinued Drug Product List of the Orange Book.  In such cases, FDA has stated time and time again that when an NDA designated as the RLD is discontinued for reasons other than safety or effectiveness “[a]pproved ANDAs that refer to the NDAs . . . are unaffected by the discontinued marketing of the products subject to those NDAs. . . .  If FDA determines that labeling for these drug products should be revised to meet current standards, the agency will advise ANDA applicants to submit such labeling.”  FDA, Notice, Determination That MOTRIN (Ibuprofen) Tablets and Four Other Drug Products Were Not Withdrawn From Sale for Reasons of Safety or Effectiveness, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,352, 48,353 (Aug. 10, 2010) (emphasis added).

By William T. Koustas & John R. Fleder –

Google, Inc. (“Google”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) (acting in concert with FDA’s Office of Criminal Investigations) have settled the government’s criminal investigation into Google’s AdWords program, which displayed advertisements on websites for online Canadian pharmacies.  The government contends that these advertisements resulted in the unlawful importation of controlled and non-controlled prescription drugs into the United States.  Google has agreed to pay $500 million as a civil forfeiture in order to resolve this matter.

The government claims that, since 2003, Google was aware that online Canadian pharmacies were using Google’s AdWords program to place advertisements on websites to illegally sell prescription products to U.S. consumers.  In the just released Non-Prosecution Agreement (“the Agreement”), the government acknowledges that in 2009, Google took steps to prevent pharmacies outside the U.S. from advertising on AdWords.  However, the government contends that for six prior years Google failed to take the same actions to prevent Canadian pharmacies from placing advertisements on Google in order to sell drugs to U.S. consumers.  Indeed, the government claims that Google actively assisted some online Canadian pharmacies to target their advertisements to U.S. consumers.  The government claims that the “shipment of prescription drugs from pharmacies outside the United States to customers in the U.S. typically violates the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and in the case of controlled prescription drugs, the Controlled Substances Act.”

The Agreement also states that once Google became aware of the government’s investigation in 2009, Google required online pharmacies to engage the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy to certify that online pharmacies seeking to advertise on AdWords were accredited through its Verified Internet Pharmacy Practice Sites (“VIPPS”) program.  According to the Agreement, the VIPPS program conducts site visits as part of the its certification process, has “stringent standards” against the issuance of prescriptions based on online consultations, and does not certify Canadian online pharmacies.  Google also hired a third-party company to detect pharmacy advertisers’ attempts to exploit flaws in the AdWords screening system designed to prevent foreign online pharmacies from advertising to U.S. customers without Google’s knowledge.  In fact, Google has sued online pharmacy advertisers that have violated Google’s terms of use for advertisers.

In addition to paying $500 million, Google has agreed to take a number of remedial steps that are outlined in the Agreement.  These steps are intended to prevent online foreign pharmacies from using AdWords to advertise to U.S. customers.

The government agreed to release Google from any further civil, administrative or equitable claims relating to this issue; however, it is fair to ask: why would Google enter into this Agreement and what did it really get from it?

The first tangible benefit to Google is that it has avoided a likely criminal prosecution.  It is quite clear that the DOJ was conducting a criminal investigation of Google.  What is not clear is the charges that DOJ was considering.  The Agreement does mention that Google’s supposed illegal conduct violated both the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Controlled Substances Act.  DOJ may well have threatened Google with other charges such as criminal conspiracy and/or RICO violations.  One cannot tell what DOJ threatened from the public documents.  However, one can certainly see that Google agreed to pay an amount that seems on its face to be quite large even for a company the size of Google.  Indeed, the money Google has agreed to forfeit represents far more than the money Google realized in profits, or even than the gross amount it received in revenue from the Canadian pharmacies.  It appears that Google has agreed to forfeit an amount that also includes the revenue that the Canadian pharmacies derived from sales to U.S. consumers even though Google presumably received only a small fraction of that amount in revenue.

Thus, it is a fair assumption that Google agreed to this settlement because the DOJ threatened a criminal prosecution against Google, and possibly even some of its executives, that if brought would have caused Google harm that was worth far more than the $500 million the company forfeited to the government.

This settlement also raises the important question of whether this Agreement will be used as a precedent against other companies.  Will the government pursue other organizations that do not themselves sell FDA-regulated products but which do publish advertisements for companies that sell products to U.S. consumers?  Will the government generally take the view that it will seek a monetary judgment that exceeds the revenue derived by the company with which the government settles?  Is the government’s pursuit of this case due solely to the megasize of Google?  Will the government pursue other entities this way even if those entities are not involved in the sales of pharmaceutical products through foreign online marketing to the U.S.?  Unfortunately, there is nothing in the public filings that provides clear answers to these questions.

By Riëtte van Laack –

Under the law, a manufacturer of a new dietary ingredient ("NDI") or a dietary supplement containing an NDI must notify FDA of the basis for the manufacturer’s conclusion that its product “will reasonably be expected to be safe.”  FDA’s regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 190.6, specifies what information an NDI notification ("NDIN") must contain.

In a June 3, 2011 notice, FDA announced that, based on experience from the last three years, it estimated the annual reporting burden of NDINs to be 1100 hours, i.e., 50 NDINs with an average burden of 20 hrs per NDIN.

Although FDA received several comments that its estimate was too low, it submitted its original estimate to the Office of Management and Budget.   FDA maintained that the preparation of an NDIN imposes a minimal burden because FDA requires “only that information that the manufacturer or distributor should already have developed as the basis for its conclusion that a dietary supplement containing an NDI will reasonably be expected to be safe.”  The 20 hrs is “for extracting and summarizing the relevant information from the company’s files” and presenting it as required by FDA and does not include time for generating and collecting the information.

FDA’s estimate also does not include the burden resulting from the recently issued draft NDI guidance in which the Agency indicates that dietary supplement manufacturers must submit NDINs for virtually all their dietary supplements containing an NDI – see our previous post here.  Apparently, the burden associated with this guidance is a separate issue to be considered in the future.

By Ricardo Carvajal –

Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc. ("Del Monte Fresh") sued to invalidate an FDA import alert on cantaloupe from Productos Agricolas de Oriente, S.A. ("PAO"), a Guatemalan producer that is one of Del Monte Fresh’s principal suppliers.  FDA imposed the import alert as the result of a multi-state outbreak of Salmonella Panama that FDA attributed to PAO cantaloupes.  The complaint alleges that FDA’s conclusion regarding the likely source of the outbreak “was not rationally supported by the evidence available to FDA,” and that “FDA also did not take into account evidence that did not support that conclusion.”  In specific, the complaint alleges that all tests of PAO cantaloupes for Salmonella or other pathogens have been negative, that FDA inspections and other audits of PAO have been satisfactory, and that some evidence suggests that the outbreak may have been caused by cantaloupes from other sources or foods other than cantaloupe.  Thus, if the case proceeds, it will likely focus on the sufficiency of the epidemiological evidence relied on by FDA.  Given the increasing sophistication of (and reliance on) epidemiological investigations in responding to outbreaks of foodborne illness, that makes this a case to watch.

It’s that time of year again when we at FDA Law Blog turn to our loyal readers and say:  “Our fellow Blogerians, Ask not what your blog can do for you – ask what you can do for your blog.”  Yes, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) announced that it is now accepting 2011 nominations for the Blawg 100 (the top 100 legal blogs – or “blawgs” – in the blogosphere).  With your help we made the top 100 list the past two years.  This year, with your help once again, we are hoping to add another championship ring (ok, it’s really a badge for posting on the blog) and join the list of winning teams with three-peat occurrences.

We ask that FDA Law Blog readers use the ABA’s Blawg 100 Amici Form and nominate FDA Law Blog!  Although it’s called a “friend-of-the-blawg brief,” filling out the form will take only a couple of minutes.  In fact, you only have 500 characters to say why you’re a fan of the blog.  Remember, when you complete the nomination form, our URL is www.fdalawblog.net.  (There are other blawgs out there with – gasp! – curiously similar URLs and/or names to FDA Law Blog.  But, hey, imitation is the best form of flattery, right?)  Friend-of-the-blawg briefs are due no later than Friday, September 9th.

ABA editors make the final decisions about what’s included in the Blawg 100.  We hope they’ll be impressed with what our readers have to say about us.  Thank you!

By Kurt R. Karst –      

Recently we reported on the “other battle” going on concerning patents listed in the Orange Book for The Medicines Company’s (“MDCO’s”) ANGIOMAX (bivalirudin) Injection.  With patent reform reportedly high on President Obama’s agenda, and with the fast approaching September 6th return of House and Senate Members from recess, when, according to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV), the House-passed patent reform bill – the America Invents Act (H.R. 1249) – will be the first item taken up for consideration in the Senate, we thought an update was in order on where things stand with MDCO’s efforts to obtain a Patent Term Extension (“PTE”) for U.S. Patent No. 5,196,404 (“the ‘404 patent”) covering ANGIOMAX. 

Section 37 of H.R. 1249, titled “Calculation of 60-day period for application of patent term extension,” would amend the PTE law at 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(1) to provide that the 60-day period “beginning on the date the product received permission . . . for commercial marketing or use” would begin on the next business day “if such permission is transmitted after 4:30 P.M., Eastern Time, on a business day, or is transmitted on a day that is not a business day.”  This provision would effectively codify Judge Claude M. Hilton’s August 3, 2010 decision in The Medicines Company v. Kappos, 731 F. Supp. 2d 470 (E.D. Va. 2010), in which Judge Hilton ordered the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to consider timely filed MDCO’s PTE application for the ‘404 patent.  (We note that FDA recently informed the PTO that the 180-day period for filing a due diligence petition for a determination of whether the PTE applicant acted with due diligence during the regulatory review period passed without the filing of such a petition.)  Senator Reid recently filed cloture on a motion to proceed with H.R. 1249.  Barring any amendments added to the bill in the Senate, the House would not need to further consider the legislation.  

Interest in (read lobbying for and against) the inclusion of Section 37 in what might become the enacted version of the America Invents Act has been running high.  A few weeks back, we reported on two instances in which PTE applicants for patents covering BEYAZ (drospirenone/ethinyl estradiol/levomefolate calcium and levomefolate calcium) Tablets and SYMBICORT (budesonide; formoterol fumarate dihydrate) Inhalation Aerosol notified the PTO that, pursuant to The Medicines Company decision, their PTE applications should be considered timely filed because of after business hours NDA approvals.  Since that post, we have become aware of a third instance in which The Medicines Company decision has been raised in a petition to the PTO. 

Specifically, AstraZeneca AB (“Astra”) contends in a recent Request for Reconsideration of Final Agency Action submitted to the PTO that its PTE application for U.S. Patent No. 5,817,338 (“the ‘338 patent”) covering PRILOSEC OTC (omeprazole magnesium) Delayed-Release Tablets was timely submitted.  As we previously reported, the PTO determined in December 2008 that the 60-day period for submitting a PTE application for the ‘338 patent began on June 20, 2003, when FDA approved NDA No. 021229, and ended on August 18, 2003, making Astra’s August 19, 2003 PTE application untimely.  According to Astra, however, FDA approved NDA No. 021229 at 4:47 PM on June 20th.  Therefore, Astra states:

in accordance with [sic] district court’s decision in The Medicines Company, Applicant’s period to file the PTE Application did not begin to run until the first business day following the FDA’s after-hours transmission.  The next business day was Monday, June 23, 2003.  If the first day of the 60 day period set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(1) was June 23, 2003, then [sic] 60 day period ended on August 21, 2003, thus rendering the submission of the PTE Application on August 19, 2003, timely within the meaning of § 156(d)(1).

After business hours approvals have provided fodder for MDCO to lobby on Capitol Hill for the inclusion of Section 37 in the America Invents Act, portraying Section 37 as a law of general applicability rather than as single company legislation.  One lobbying piece that is supposedly circulating on Capitol Hill includes a table identifying several instances in which PTE applications were allegedly filed late under the PTO’s pre-The Medicines Company counting method in which the day of approval counted as day 1.  “[T]o the extent transmission of FDA approval for these drugs occurred after normal business hours, Section 37 could also benefit these additional innovators – who also were caught in a procedural trap by the PTO,” says the two-page lobbying piece. 

Advocacy letters have also been submitted to Members of Congress.  A letter from Massachusetts General Hospital to Sens. Herb Kohl (D-WI) and Michael Lee (R-UT) extends the hospital’s support for the inclusion of Section 37 in H.R. 1429.  Another letter signed by 25 doctors from across the country and sent to U.S. Senate leaders says that the passage of Section 37 “is critically important to medicine and patients,” that “[b]y clarifying the rules on patent restoration, the provision will help all companies – both now and in the future – by providing the certainty necessary to encourage them to invest the money and effort needed to bring innovative new drugs to the market,” and that “[t]he provision will also ensure that government officials interpret the rules in a consistent manner.” 

Meanwhile, the Generic Pharmaceutical Association (“GPhA”) has been lobbying against inclusion of Section 37 in the America Invents Act.  In June, GPhA lamented over the House’s “failure to correct a fatal flaw in the bill.”  According to FDA Week (subscription required), GPhA is currently focusing its patent reform lobbying efforts on stripping Section 37 from the America Invents Act.