Court Rejects Challenge to DEA ALJ Hearing Authority Over Removal Power

Last month, we blogged on the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) abrupt announcement that it had determined that removal restrictions protecting administrative law judges (ALJs) were “unconstitutional” and that DOJ would no longer defend those removal restrictions in court.  We opined that while the impact of this statement was unclear, it was likely that this position would make it more difficult for litigants challenging the constitutionality of a proceeding presided by an ALJ.

That’s precisely what happened in a recent decision out of the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island in a case challenging a DEA ALJ’s authority to preside over a hearing as to whether the plaintiff’s application for a DEA registration should be granted or denied.  In MMJ BioPharma Cultivation, Inc. v. Bondi, No. 24-CA-127 (D.R.I.), the plaintiff—a company seeking to obtain a DEA registration to cultivate marijuana for research purposes—applied for a DEA registration, and then received an order to show cause from DEA as to why the agency should not deny its application.  The plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ, but then filed the lawsuit in federal court seeking injunctive relief and arguing that the constraints on the President’s power to remove DEA ALJs are “unconstitutional.”

The Court granted DOJ’s motion to dismiss.  Specifically, the Court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for injunctive relief because it did not demonstrate that it would suffer “irreparable harm” absent the requested relief, a key requirement for granting injunctive relief.  The Court noted the difference between “appointment” challenges—contesting the constitutional validity of the appointment of the officer adjudicating a case—and “removal” challenges, which address whether an officer is improperly protected from removal by the President.  The Court explained that just “because an officer is unconstitutionally protected from removal does not mean that they lack constitutional authority to carry out the role for which they were appointed.”  Id. at 5.  Instead, “there must be a showing that the unconstitutional [removal] provision affected or likely will affect the decision.”  Id. at 6.

Because the plaintiff solely pleaded that it was entitled to relief because the DEA ALJ presiding over its case was unconstitutionally protected from removal—and did not allege how these removal protections affected or were likely to affect DEA’s adjudication of its case—the Court dismissed the case.

We will continue monitoring other attempts to challenge the authority of DEA’s ALJs to preside over hearings, but, as we predicted, we expect that other attempts will face similar hurdles.