Supreme Court Hands Device Makers Big Victory

In an 8-to-1 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held earlier this week that preemption principles and the 1976 Medical Device Amendments (“MDA”) bar common law claims on the basis of safety or effectiveness of devices approved by FDA under a Premarket Approval Application (“PMA”).  The case, Riegel v. Medtronic, is a decisive victory for device manufacturers.  In the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the Court ruled that certain state tort claims involving medical devices cleared under the premarket notification (i.e., 510(k)) process are not preempted.  The Riegel case provides a definitive decision preempting state tort law claims for PMA-approved devices. 

The plaintiffs in the case, Charles and Donna Riegel, brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York after Charles Riegel was injured in heart surgery.  During the surgery, his doctor inserted a Medtronic Evergreen Balloon Catheter into his coronary artery but inflated it beyond its rated burst pressure.  The catheter burst, causing Mr. Riegel to develop a blocked heart and require coronary bypass surgery.  The Riegels alleged that the catheter was designed, labeled, and manufactured in a manner that violated New York common law, and that these defects caused Mr. Riegel’s injury and suffering. 

Both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in favor of Medtronic.  The Second Circuit, which joined a number of circuits that have addressed this issue, reasoned in its 2006 opinion that because devices approved through the PMA process are subject to the standards set forth in their approved applications, such devices are subject to “a requirement applicable to the device under [the FDC Act],” and that the claims for strict liability, breach of warranty, and negligent design, testing, inspection, distribution, labeling, marketing, and sale would (if successful) impose state “requirements” that differed from, or added to, the PMA-approved standards for the device.

The MDA provides federal oversight for devices and amended the FDC Act to add § 521 (21 U.S.C. §360k(a)), which states, in relevant part: 

[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement –

(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this Act to the device, and

(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this Act.

In granting review in this case, the Supreme Court was asked to address the following question:

Whether the express preemption provision of the Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §360k(a), preempts state-law claims seeking damages for injuries caused by medical devices that received premarket approval from the Food and Drug Administration.

Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that the Court would adhere to a view that “requirements” under the MDA include common-law causes of action for negligence.  Justice Scalia explained that state tort law is a method of controlling conduct and “[s]tate tort law that requires a manufacturer’s catheters to be safer, but hence less effective, than the model the FDA has approved disrupts the federal scheme no less than state regulatory law to the same effect.”  However, Justice Scalia stated that FDC Act § 521 does not prevent damages based on claims that a device manufacturer violated FDA regulations, as these “parallel” cases “add to federal requirements.” 

The opinion includes interesting dictum (on page 13) with respect to the effect that FDA’s current view supporting preemption is entitled only to little deference because of the different position FDA has previously taken.  Justice Scalia states in response to Justice Ginsburg’s dissent that:

In the case before us, the FDA has supported the position taken by our opinion with regard to the meaning of the statute. We have found it unnecessary to rely upon that agency view because we think the statute itself speaks clearly to the point at issue. If, however, we had found the statute ambiguous and had accorded the agency’s current position deference, the dissent is correct . . . that – inasmuch as mere Skidmore deference would seemingly be at issue – the degree of deference might be reduced by the fact that the agency’s earlier position was different. . . .  But of course the agency’s earlier position . . . is even more compromised, indeed deprived of all claim to deference, by the fact that it is no longer the agency’s position.

Justice Ginsburg, the lone voice of dissent, argued that “Congress. . .did not intend [FDC Act § 521] to effect a radical curtailment of state common-law suits seeking compensation for injuries caused by defectively designed or labeled medical devices.”  Justice Ginsberg admonished the majority’s decision as contrary to the “MDA’s central purpose: to protect consumer safety.”

Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA), who sponsored the MDA, spoke out against the decision, stating “Congress never intended that FDA approval would give blanket immunity to manufacturers from liability for injuries caused by faulty devices.”  Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA) also expressed disappointment with the decision, vowing that Congress will “pass legislation as quickly as possible to fix this nonsensical situation.”

Additional information on this case, including briefs and analysis, is available from SCOTUSBlog.